Married in 1952, a husband a wife had four children. On March 12, 2006, the husband suffered a stroke. On March 28, 2006, the DeKalb County Probate Court appointed the youngest child and one of his brothers as temporary conservators and guardians of the husband (their father). On May 26, their appointments expired. On July 21, 2006, the husband executed two deeds conveying land to the youngest child. One deed was a warranty deed; the other, a quitclaim deed. On July 25, 2006, an attorney was appointed to serve as conservator and guardian for the husband. On August 7, 2006, the husband executed a deed conveying property to his wife.
On August 26, 2006, the wife sued the youngest child and her husband in DeKalb County Circuit Court. In her complaint, the wife sought cancellation of the two deeds executed on July 21. Her grounds for this requested cancellation were that the deeds—
The husband's conservator (the attorney) answered this complaint and filed a counterclaim seeking cancellation of the August 7 deed.
On October 12, 2007, the husband died, and the probate court appointed a special administrator of his estate. The special administrator moved to substitute the husband's estate in the circuit court case; the court granted the administrator's motion.
On May 23, the circuit court granted the administrator's summary-judgment motion to cancel the August 7 deed because the husband was represented by a conservator and guardian on that date and therefore lacked power to execute the deed. However, the court denied the administrator's motion to cancel the two July 21 deeds because the husband was not represented by a conservator and guardian at that time and because there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the husband was mentally competent when he executed those two deeds.
Subsequently, the wife was appointed executrix of her husband's estate, and she consequently realigned the estate to a plaintiff's role in seeking to cancel the July 21 deeds.
On August 12, 2010, after a hearing, the circuit court entered a judgment finding that the youngest child had exercised undue influence over his father and therefore ordered the deeds set aside and vacated.
The son appealed, and the Alabama Court of Civil Appeals affirmed the circuit court's ruling. The court explained that the party seeking to set aside a deed for undue influence (the wife and mother, in this case) needs to show that the grantee (the son, in this case) was the dominant party to the transaction. Once this is shown, the burden shifts to the grantee to show that the transaction was fair, just, and equitable in every respect. The appeals court found that there was sufficient evidence for the circuit court to conclude that the youngest son had exercised undue influence and that the transactions was not fair, just, and equitable in every respect. In reaching this conclusion, the court cited the following evidence in particular:
See Brown v. Brown, decided on September 16, 2011.
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Guardianships and
Conservatorships.
